A poor clarification of stance

(the following post is in continued defense of what I defended in one of my classes... that Good should not be paired with evil, but with Not-good, or the privation of good... see circular reasoning on my other blog for a better treatment of that particular topic, the following is particular to the idea that such a stance leads to a "continuum" problem that then destroys the possibility of God.)

Thinking about it further, it (good and not good, instead of good vs evil) does seem to require a continuum of some sort… but I would say this is only the case if free will has a small (or possibly any finite) value.

If free will does have a small or finite value, and we accept the good vs not-good idea (both of which together seem to lead to a continuum of goodness<-->nothing<-->not-goodness) and there is a God, then we can never have a world of any sort. Which seems an argument akin to theodicy. I say this as, if there is a continuum of good, and a God who desires the best possible good for everything, then the best possible good for everything is obviously to be as good as God, i.e., be God. But this most likely leads to a contradiction. (It might not… as equally perfect beings who have the exact same nature and desires{which would be necessary as the first God is and wants the Highest good, so for each other God to be as Good, they would have to be identical to the first God} be a contradiction?) In either case though, this world would not exist, and the theist would loose.

But I maintain that free will has value beyond our understanding that gives even the choice (for some) between stealing a candy and walking away before entering the store, a value beyond what one might otherwise say, a value that transcends the continuum. So where as one would be right to question the possibility of a God in a ‘continuum’ world where free will is a limited good, one should find it more difficult to question a world where the free will choice of choosing “God” over “not-God” contains an equal or higher value than creating identical Gods. (This is the part that is the reason I call this post “A poor clarification of stance”)

This transcendence is the inclusion of the choice of a finite being having the ability to choose an infinite good… namely God.