Re: free will isn't so problematic

This is from a discussion we're having in my Philosophy of Quantum Mechanics class:

So in either case we end up not having the free will that we would like to have. In a deterministic universe we don't seem to have genuine freedom to do other than what we in fact do, and in an indeterministic universe it's not clear how we can claim authorship and responsibility for actions that arise from indeterministic causes.

But the universe is either deterministic or indeterministic. That exhausts the possiblities. So it seems like genuine freedom of the will, the kind that most people want when then they say they want it, is impossible.

My response:
I agree that the world has to be either deterministic or indeterministic. But I think there's a difference between a materialist and a dualist idea of determinism.

I think a non material mind could be a self-determined entity. Whereas it would appear the only self-determined entity in a materialist perspective would be the system taken in its entirety.

I believe it entirely possible that a God could create a soul and empower the soul with a measure of self-creation. Such that the soul could create a nature that has abilities/character that can not be accounted for by the original nature or character.

Isn't this still deterministic in the same sense as the materialist?

No. I think the ability of creation endows its owner with a creative essence that is uniquely self-determinstic(I'm not good with formulating this argument as I've never tried before, so I apologise for it's crudeness).

Thus in the "world" there are several self-deterministic entities interacting. So though there are deterministic methods, there is not A deterministic method for the world. Thus the system is neiter a classically deterministic one, nor is it an indeterministic one, it is somewhere in between.