The Extinction of Ether

The Extinction of the Ether

Traditional wave mechanics, derived from waves in water, air
and solids, lead to the natural supposition that there would be a substance
that light propagated through. This substance eventually developed into the
hypothesis of the “‘quasi-rigid’ luminiferous ethername="_ednref1" title="">class=MsoEndnoteReference>[1], the parts of which can carry
out no movements relatively to one another except the small movements of
deformation which correspond to light-waves.” (Einstein, 1920) This special
substance was assumed to exist and mainstream science did not challenge it,
rather science sought to discover the ether’s properties. It was around the
turn of the 20^th century that mainstream science actually began to
question the ether hypothesis. Through the Michelson-Morley Experiment and the
advent of Special Relativity, the luminiferous ether rapidly became extinct.

Michelson-Morley Experiment

The Michelson-Morley Experiment was designed to detect the
rate at which the ether wind blew, not to question its existence. By having
two identical pulses of light traveling perpendicular to each other over an
equal distance, the experimenters expected to discover the direction and
magnitude of the ether wind. Much like one could tell the speed of a river
current by swimming straight across and back if you swim at a known constant
speed. Also, if the direction of the current is in question, you can figure
out both the current speed and direction of the current by having two swimmers
swim on perpendicular paths and figuring out the difference in their times. Figure
1 shows the setup of the experiment.

Figure 1

height=268 src="Phil%20Sci%20Ether%20Paper_files/image001.gif" />

The source is at (S), from which a light beam is emitted
towards a half silvered mirror (a) which is at a 45 degree angle. (a) splits
the beam into two identical parts, reflecting half of the original beam towards
(b) and transmitting half to (c). Both new beams reflect off of the mirrors at
(b) and (c) , respectively, and return to (a) where both beams are split in
half again, with half of both beams heading towards (s) and half going to (d).
At (d) is located an observer. This whole experiment is place on top of a
large turntable.

By taking interference measurements between the two waves
and then rotating the table a few degrees and repeating the measurements, Michelson
and Morley calculated that they could detect an ether wind with a velocity as
little as 1-2 miles per second (Fowler-MM). After completing the experiment, Michelson
Morley could not find any differentiation in the interference measurements, the
“null result”. A result often repeated since, with ever increasing precision.
This null result did not itself lead to a denial of the Ether, due to some keen
explanations from prominent scientists and mathematicians (e.g., Lorentz and
his transform), but rather began the questioning of the Ether’s existence.

Special Relativity

Special Relativity has two primary assumptions: 1.) The laws
of Physics are the same in all frames of reference (the Principle of
Relativity, PR) and 2.) Light travels at c in all frames of reference (the
Light Postulate, LP). The PR is at direct odds with the conception of a “‘quasi-rigid’
luminiferous ether”; as such an ether would define a preferred frame of
reference (an absolute space where absolute velocities and locations are
identifiable). The existence of the ether then turned on the credibility of
Special Relativity. If Special Relativity is the case, then the conception of
the ether is “superfluous inasmuch as the view… will not require an ‘absolutely
stationary space’”. (Einstein, 1905) Special Relativity and its postulates
were supported by various cases; the PR is supported by cases such as Maxwell’s
Asymmetry, the LP is supported by cases like the Pion experiments, and the
whole theory is supported by the Muon cases.

Maxwell’s Asymmetry

Maxwell’s Asymmetry was the idea that absolute velocity
relations to an absolute space (the ether) would matter in how we explain
phenomena. The prevailing view is that Asymmetry should only apply if the
actual phenomena experience an difference (asymmetry) in outcome, but that did
not seem the case. Two examples of Maxwell’s Asymmetry were the speed of light
problem and the magnet/ring problem.

Speed of light problem

Maxwell’s laws led to the calculation of the speed of light,
which appeared (according to the equations) to be an absolute value. If the
speed of light was absolute and the ether did exist, then one would expect the
speed of light to be in reference to the absolute space created by the ether.
If you could travel at the speed of light then an electromagnetic field
traveling in the same direction would have no magnetic component (due to the
relative velocity of the observer and the electromagnetic field being zero),
which brings the contradiction (according to Maxwell’s laws) of an electric
field with no corresponding magnetic field. This questioned the validity of
the notion of absolute velocity and absolute space.

Magnet/Ring problem

The Magnet/Ring problem is the asymmetry caused by two
different laws of Maxwell’s. The two competing laws are in Figure 2. In
Figure 2.A, the magnet is in motion relative to the ring conductor creating an
electric field around the magnet that causes an electric current in the ring. In
Figure 2.B the ring is in equal motion relative to the magnet, but no electric
field is created, though an electromotive force causes an equal current in the
ring.

Figure 2

src="Phil%20Sci%20Ether%20Paper_files/image002.gif" />

It is this asymmetry in
explanation that Einstein cites in the beginning of his 1905 paper. To
Einstein and others, the idea of having two laws describing similar events with
identical outcomes was untenable; there should be one law that describes both
cases. And thus the need for absolute space again was questioned, as the two
cases of Maxwell’s would have different absolute velocities, but the same
outcome. If absolute space doesn’t create a difference in outcome, then it
should be abandoned as meaningless.

Pion (Alvager et. al. 1964)

An alternate explanation for the speed of light being
constant is the conception that c is constant relative to the source or emitter
of the light. If this was the case one would expect that a person traveling
near the speed of light who turned on a flashlight would measure the speed of
the flashlight at c, and a stationary observer would measure the speed of the
light emitted from the flashlight at 2c. However, Alvager’s neutral pion
experiment in 1964, tried out just this arrangement (with the person being
replaced by a neutral pion, and the turning on of the flashlight being replaced
by the decay of the pion releasing photons). Alvager and his team accelerated
a neutral pion to 0.99975 c and after the pion decayed measured the speed of
the light emitted. The speed turned out to be c, thus supporting Einstein’s LP.

Muonclass=MsoEndnoteReference>style='font-size:14.0pt;line-height:200%;font-family:Arial'>[2]

If there was a preferred frame of reference (ether), then
one would expect time and length to be defined by that preferred frame, and
thus standard for all objects in the universe. But from the LP and PR, one can
derive time dilation and length contraction effects, which define time and
length relative to the frame one is in. In 1941, researchers detecting muons
were able to prove time dilation and length contraction effects. At the top of
Mount Washington, muons entering our atmosphere at near the speed of light
(.994c) were detected at a rate of 570 per hour. 6,000 feet below researchers
expected to detect only 35 per hour, due to the calculation of the muons going through
four half-lives in 6 microseconds over the 6,000 feet. However, they detected
400 per hour. The explanation is that the muons experienced a length
contraction of the 6,000 feet into 670 feet, due to their high velocity, and a
time dilation in the expected 6 microseconds to only .67 microseconds. These
effects permit the muons to appear to be living longer to stationary observers,
though in the muons’ frame of reference, they are living just as long as they
would at any speed.

The End of Ether

The Michelson-Morley Experiment and the advent of Special
Relativity defeated the notion of a “‘quasi-rigid’ luminiferous ether”. With
the extinction of the ether hypothesis and the corresponding absolute space, modern
science adopted Special Relativity as the standard explanation of mechanics,
and the luminiferous ether was relegated to science history books. It is
interesting to note that scientists today do generally accept a modification of
the ether idea due to the advent of General Relativity, though it is called “’the
metric’, ‘space’, or ‘vacuum’”. (Wikipedia)

---

class=MsoEndnoteReference>style='font-size:10.0pt;line-height:200%;font-family:Arial'>[1]
I speak of “‘quasi-rigid’ luminiferous ether” specifically as Einstein in his
1920 address at the University of Leyden supports a modification of the ether
idea.

Recapitulating,
we may say that according to the general theory of relativity space is endowed
with physical qualities; in this sense, therefore, there exists an ether.
According to the general theory of relativity space without ether is
unthinkable; for in such space there not only would be no propagation of light,
but also no possibility of existence for standards of space and time
(measuring-rods and clocks), nor therefore any space-time intervals in the
physical sense.

A Quantum impact on the Free will-Determinism Debate: Redux

Introduction

For the last few centuries, those wishing to deny the existence of genuine free will have looked to the deterministic nature of the natural sciences, especially physics, to support their claims. These “Determinists” have found ample and convincing evidence for their claims in classical physics. However, with the relatively recent advent of quantum physics, in the early 1920’s, a reassessing of the support provided to the Determinists’ position has begun to occur. The orthodox interpretation of Quantum Mechanics seems to provide a fruitful place to undermine the Determinists’ supposition that physics, as a model of the world, prohibits genuine free will. The purpose of this paper is to provide background in the Free Will-Determinism Debate and support genuine free will using the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics.

Metaphysical Considerations

There are various metaphysical considerations to be dealt with in Free Will-Determinism Debate. To clarify the scope of this paper, I will first define the metaphysical terms I will be using, then proceed to a brief analysis of common views held in light of these definitions.

Definitions:

Freedom

“Freedom is the power, rooted in reason and will, to act or not to act, to do this or that, and so to perform deliberate actions on one's own responsibility.” (CCC 1731)

“Genuine” Free will

Genuine Free will is the ability to control one’s actions via a choice that is determined as a free agent. "The proper act of free will is choice, for we say that we have a free-will because we can take one thing while refusing another; and this is to choose... two things occur in choice... we judge one thing to be preferred to another... [and] the appetite should accept the judgment..." (Summa Theologica I, 83,3 in Kreeft 1990, 299)

Free agent

is one who has free will or “[a] person who can initiate and control his own actions … ‘[a] Master over his own acts’” (CCC 1730) Being a master over one’s own acts entails both the abilities of “unique” initiation and “primary” control. It is not necessary for a free agent to actually exhibit both or either of the abilities in a given action to grant it the status of a genuine Free Will expression, it is sufficient that the agent has and can utilise these abilities, is not under duress and the action is voluntary. From this “free agency” one can be deemed responsible for actions, though this does not necessarily equate to full responsibility as “[i]mputability and responsibility for an action can be diminished or even nullified by ignorance, inadvertence, duress, fear, habit, inordinate attachments, and other psychological or social factors.” (CCC 1735).

“Unique” initiation

is the ability of the self to cause events that would otherwise not occur if left to the sole influence of natural events.

“Primary” control

is the ability of the self, and thus not solely natural stimuli or events, to dispose or predispose oneself to certain behaviours, thoughts, choices, desires, etc.

(Causal) Determinism

“The world is governed by (or is under the sway of) determinism if and only if, given a specified way things are at a time t, the way things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law.” (Hoefer)

Indeterminism

is the view that there are some events that are not causally “fixed as a matter of natural law,” namely free will choices.

Common Views:

Two Primary divisions exist in the Free Will-Determinism Debate, Incompatibilism and Compatibilism under which individual views are further divided.

Incompatibilism

All views classified beneath Incompatibilism deny that free will and a deterministic world are compatible, they believe one necessarily precludes the other.

“Hard” determinism

Hard determinism is an incompatibilist view that holds that the world IS deterministic in nature and thus genuine free will can not exist. This is as people have no control or choice over their actions that is not fixed from antecedent events which extend even prior to their birth. Thus this view can not recognise genuine “responsibility” as people have no real influence upon their own actions.

Libertarianism

“The view that some human actions are free and not causally determined” (Geirsson 1998, 487). This view falls under indeterminism in that there is no causal determinacy for actions, which leads to the possibility of deliberating over a decision, deciding, preparing to act and instead of acting the way decided and deliberated, the person acts in a completely different fashion than intended, desired, chosen, or willed. This is contrary to St. Thomas’ idea that “the appetite should accept the judgment” as part of what it means to choose. And if one can not choose, one can not have genuine free will.

Compatibilism

Compatibilist views hold that free will and causal determinism are compatible, though how they are compatible are the defining parts of the individual views.

“Soft” determinism

The view that determinism and meaningful free will are compatible, this view rejects genuine free will and claims that free will should be thought of as relative to one’s desires. Meaningful free will for the soft determinist is not the ability to have chosen differently given the circumstances, but that it is the ability to have chosen differently had the agent willed so (i.e., under a different predisposition of beliefs and desires) (Geirsson 1998, 367 and Wikipedia). An alternate view of soft determinism is that the very act of self deliberation determines an act as free, if the deliberation leads to an action that is intentional and not coerced by an external or internal agent (e.g., brainwashing or disease) (Roberts). Soft determinist views hold that predispositions are determined. The views under the classification of soft determinism are not consistent with the free agent being a person who can ultimately control his own actions, as the person lacks what is required for “primary” control, namely the ability of the self to uniquely initiate predispositions. Thus responsibility seems ultimately unable to be attributed to the person.

Self-determinism

Self-determinism is “the view that an action is free when it is produced by a free will, and a will is free when it is determined by an agent who is not causally determined to will in this way.” (Geirsson 1998, 489) This view is indeterministic in that the decisions of a self-determined agent are not fixed by a natural law, though it is deterministic in that there is some non-natural law that may govern this, which may be completely unique to the individual free agent, generic to all free agents, or most likely a mixture of both (discussions of this deterministic law are beyond the scope of this paper, as it seems the discussion would be heavily laden with theological concepts). According to Geirsson only events can truly be causally determined, and a free agent is not an event but a special object with unique attributes, which permits it to be viewed as compatibilist (Geirsson 1998, 369). This view seems to be most in keeping with the idea of genuine free will. But let us now turn to the Quantum frame work which might be in most keeping with genuine free will.

Orthodox Quantum Framework

The Copenhagen interpretation is considered the orthodox view of Quantum Mechanics and is most widely supported by physicists. Two of its relevant features for the Free will-Determinism Debate are its view that quantum mechanics is inherently indeterministic via the Uncertainty Principle and through Observer Dependence.

Uncertainty Principle

Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle is an indeterminacy at the very heart of the Orthodox Interpretation. In the Uncertainty Paper of 1927, Heisenberg states: “The more precisely the position is determined, the less precisely the momentum is known in this instant, and vice versa.” (AIP 1). This is commonly interpreted as being due to the wave/particle duality of all objects, where the wave aspect represents a probability of the particle’s actual location which does not exist until observed (see Observer Dependence below). In the same paper, Heisenberg says “[i]n the sharp formulation of the law of causality—‘if we know the present exactly, we can calculate the future’-it is not the conclusion that is wrong but the premise.” (AIP 2) This inherent uncertainty is hostile to Determinism, leading to an indeterminism that provides for some events that are not causally fixed according to natural laws, though these events are quantum events, not free will choices.

Observer Dependence

Observer Dependence is a response to the indeterminacy in the Measurement Problem. This indeterminacy is due to the relationship between the moments before and at the time an observation of the system is made. Prior to observation, a system is considered to be following the deterministic “Schrödinger” dynamic. Schrödinger used wave equations to describe quantum systems as one that exists in a superposition, where any and all possible measurement outcomes are represented. At the time of observation, the system is said to exhibit the “collapse” dynamic, where only one outcome is present. The indeterminacy arises from the “discontinuous, random ‘jump’” from the Schrödinger to the collapse dynamic. This indeterminacy exists if the Schrödinger wave equation has a minute length or a length that spans light years.

Heisenberg formulates his response to the measurement problem with regard to observation. “I believe that the existence of the classical "path" can be pregnantly formulated as follows: The "path" comes into existence only when we observe it.” (AIP 2) The concept of “path” does not exist except when we observe it, without measurement

“the unobserved object is a mixture of both the wave and particle pictures until the experimenter chooses what to observe in a given experiment”(AIP 2). Observer dependence is this idea that without an observer, a quantum system remains in a superposition of all the possible states that it could be in. That is, if a ball can be red or blue, then without an observer to say it is either red or it is blue, then the ball is said to have a mixture of both properties (the superposition).

This proposition is best exemplified by the double slit experiment, in which an observer can determine the behaviour of a particle by the act of observing. The setup of the experiment is as such: a single photon emitting light source is separated from a detector by a barrier with two parallel slits. If the observer chooses TO NOT observe which slit the single photon goes through, then the photon’s behaviour is displayed by the detector as an interference pattern, thus the single photon is said to have existed in a superposition of all possible states (of travel between emitter and detector). If the observer chooses TO observe which slit the single photon goes through, then the photon’s behaviour is displayed by the detector as a point, thus the single photon is said to have existed in only one particular state due to the observation.

The Connection

Quantum mechanics does not provide for a world of uncaused events, but instead says that individual quantum events are caused through an indeterministic principle that precludes one from fully anticipating which possible outcome would occur. In general it is understood that the indeterministic principle is in some manner a randomness amongst possible measurements. I propose to support the idea that there is some other indeterministic principle, namely free will, that governs or affects specific quantum events. Just as the basic quantum indeterminacy principle of randomness is limited in scope by the matter to which it is tied, namely specific quantum events, free will is limited in scope by the actual matter to which it is tied, namely the individual free agent. So the effects of free will upon quantum events is limited to the body of the individual free agent. The effects of free will upon quantum indeterminacy is to predetermine which consequent quantum event will occur, akin to loading the dice. To further understand this view, let us turn to some objections.

Objections to this view

Two primary objections to this view are based on the assumptions of randomness and a classical limit.

Randomness

Philosopher David Chalmers argues that “[T]he theory [that quantum indeterminacy allows free will] contradicts the quantum-mechanical postulate that these microscopic ‘decisions’ are entirely random..” (Barr 2003, 180). This first argument against quantum effects being significant metaphysically to the Free Will-Determinism Debate derives from the very nature of the collapse dynamic. Chalmers argues that either the state which the collapse dynamic actualises is completely random or we would be able to notice detectable patterns. He continues by saying that it is completely random. And randomness does not lead to freewill, he argues that so far as states (all physical states not just quantum) are not random they are deterministic. And if something is random or deterministic, then there can be no rational free will decision involved. So he concludes that either way free will can not be the case.

Response to Randomness

Physicist Stephen Barr says this is an “unnecessarily restrictive” view of quantum mechanics. He insists that “if quantum theory says two outcomes are equally probable, that can be interpreted simply as meaning that there is nothing in the physical situation itself that prefers one outcome to the other” (Barr 2003, 180). Thus denying one of Chalmers’ premises, in favour of trying to show that we can notice detectable patterns. In this regard we refer to the scope of the free will, which is the agent. Do we notice detectable patterns in free agents? It is a fact that we indeed do, free agent behaviour shows detectable patterns, and Barr argues that such patterns are neither so exact that they can be defined in terms of a mechanical law nor so erratic that they are completely random (Barr 2003, 180).

Classical Limit

The idea of a classical limit is the point where the indeterminacy of quantum theory stops and the determinacy of a classical system takes over. It is said the brain is past the classical limit, and thus Barr’s counter-argument to Randomness fails, as even if we detect such patterns, they can’t be attributed to quantum indeterminacy. Schrödinger proposed the necessity of a classical limit via reductio ad absurdum in his classic gedankenexperiment, the “Schrödinger cat”. Schrödinger stated his argument as such:

A cat is penned up in a steel chamber, along with the following diabolical device (which must be secured against direct interference by the cat): in a Geiger counter there is a tiny bit of radioactive substance, so small, that perhaps in the course of one hour one of the atoms decays, but also with equal probability, perhaps none; if it happens, the counter tube discharges and through a relay releases a hammer which shatters a small flask of hydrocyanic acid. If one has left this entire system to its self for an hour, one would say the cat lives if meanwhile no atom has decayed. The first atomic decay would have poisoned it. (Davies 1987, 29)

The orthodox Quantum view of the cat in this enclosed box is that it must exist in the superposition of being both alive and dead, until an observer opens the box. It is only at this point and not prior that the cat snaps into one of the two states, it is either definitely alive or definitely dead, but this seems absurd! In fact, if you place a new box around the observer, the cat remains in the superposition until another observer observers the first, and this continues into an infinite regression of observers needing observing for the system to collapse. From this it is generally viewed that at some macro level the effects of quantum indeterminacy ends (though at what point is uncertain), and many view the brain to be immune in a practical way at least from such effects.

Response to Classical Limit

Physicist/Mathematician Roger Penrose (who objects to genuine free will) and Neurophysiologist Sir John Eccles posit locations where quantum effects would affect the brain’s functions. Penrose suggests “‘microtubules,’ in the ‘cytoskeletons’ of the brain’s neurons” while Eccles alternatively suggests, the “presynaptic vesicular grid” (Barr 2003, 183). Though other relevant structures might be so inconspicuous and small that they may never be discovered, and if they are, they may never be recognised as such. In fact, it is not even clear that such specialised spots are needed for quantum effects to influence the brain as the actual method behind how a free agent could act upon quantum states is as of yet undeveloped (Barr 2003, 183). These suggestions provide further opportunities for free will to respond to challenges against it.

Conclusion

The Orthodox Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics supports genuine free will against its challengers, specifically those that claim that world is deterministic and has no room for genuine free will (determinisms) and against libertarianism’s permission of uncaused events. All of which lead to worlds that do not seem to be our own. The Orthodox interpretation of Quantum Mechanics provides the small amount of indeterminacy that is a great doorway held open for the possibility of free will.

Faith

This is an excerpt from a post on one of my class' websites (following is my response):

"You have seen and believed; blessed are those who believe without
seeing." It seems to me that Christianity should be putting emphasis on believing *without* reason rather than trying to come up with scientific and logical arguments to help along their belief in God. And yet all the way back to Aquinas we have people trying to argue why it's rational to believe in God-- I find that a bit troubling. Faith, in my opinion, is one of the virtues of religion (it seems like it'd be pretty difficult to love God while viewing him as a thing to be proven rather than cherished); rabid evangelism, on the other hand, is a vice. What cause do we have to try and prove God scientifically or logically besides trying to get converts who aren't interested in having faith? Maybe I'm missing something, but it seems like getting people to believe in God because he's the logical answer seems like a cheapening of something that's supposed to be spiritual.

the arguments for faith go much farther back than aquinas... MUCH MUCH further back... I know at least to augustine's teacher ambrose, and though I can’t call off all the other early Christians who did likewise (Clement from the late 2nd century, Ignatius of Antioch from 50-110 possibly fit this), I know the arguments of faith go much much further back and I'd argue that it goes even to the bible in various verses...

For example your quote, comes from:

John 20

24 Thomas, called Didymus, one of the Twelve, was not with them when Jesus came.

25 So the other disciples said to him, "We have seen the Lord." But he said to them, "Unless I see the mark of the nails in his hands and put my finger into the nailmarks and put my hand into his side, I will not believe."

26 Now a week later his disciples were again inside and Thomas was with them. Jesus came, although the doors were locked, and stood in their midst and said, "Peace be with you."

27 Then he said to Thomas, "Put your finger here and see my hands, and bring your hand and put it into my side, and do not be unbelieving, but believe."

28 Thomas answered and said to him, "My Lord and my God!"

29 Jesus said to him, "Have you come to believe because you have seen me? Blessed are those who have not seen and have believed."

30 Now Jesus did many other signs in the presence of (his) disciples that are not written in this book.

31 But these are written that you may (come to) believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that through this belief you may have life in his name.

most people read verse 29 and assume Jesus denies the need for proof... but read further... verse 31... "But these are written that you may (come to) believe" the YOU was first and foremost the immediate audience of John (which by the way isn't us), the original audience could weigh the truth of the author's words by going to Jerusalem or hearing from Jerusalem... the author is offering proof, saying hey this is what happened... something the original audience could actually seek to verify, by seeking to find opposing views coming out of Jerusalem. (This was a relatively big deal due to the rapid conversions occurring amongst the Jews…).

So knowing that it’s being offered as proof, we can next question, does the realm of acceptable Christian proof only consist of testimonies? This very passage argues against that… Read back at v.26-27… what does Jesus do? HE COMES KNOWING THAT THOMAS DOUBTS AND EVEN OFFERS THOMAS THAT WHICH WOULD CONVINCE HIM, PHYSICAL PROOF!!! Personally, I find that AMAZING! God coming to offer even us skeptics exactly what we need to see to believe… If God’s willing to stoop so low as to offer proof, why should we be so high-minded to turn down his offer… how would the passage go if Thomas was like “I’ve seen you and touched you, but I’m not accepting that as proof of your existence, I’m going to have faith, and that’s how I’m going to accept your existence, and frankly Joe, my faith says you weren’t resurrected.”

Also, it is arguable that the “supernatural” faith that can believe in God without seeing is in fact only given to a few…

1 corinthians 12:

4 There are different kinds of spiritual gifts but the same Spirit;

…

7 To each individual the manifestation of the Spirit is given for some benefit.

8 To one is given through the Spirit the expression of wisdom; to another the expression of knowledge according to the same Spirit;

9 to another faith by the same Spirit; to another gifts of healing by the one Spirit;

This seems to imply that the “gift” of faith is given to specific people for specific reasons… but also note, the gifts of knowledge and wisdom is given to others, and I’d think that wisdom is needed to discern Truth from evidence, and the benefit of wisdom and knowledge can very well be a greater belief in God.

Some of us (including myself) need proof… God created the world; He had to have left His mark. (That’s always been a Christian argument for evangelisation.) And I’m not below turning proof down… that’s how I understand things… God knows this… and that’s actually how He came to me… and showed Himself in a way I could not deny.

Science Education

This is an excerpt from a post on one of my class' websites (following is my response): (ID is intelligent design).

In response to what distinguishes ID from Evolution, ID contains a premise that our universe or certain features of it, specifically humans, must be the way that they are in the present. The idea is that when you look at the complexity of such things as human life, you can roughly calculate the odds of such complexity evolving by random chance, and they are so small that we can hardly wrap our minds around it. ID would then say, "We obviously shouldn't accept an explanation that gives us such a small probability of attaining our current state," and go on to claim that we need an intelligent designer to help us bust those odds. In reply, we will make an appeal to the anthropic principle. We'll say, "Since human beings exist in the present, all the necessary prerequisites, including the values of physical constants and specific random mutations, attained in the past." To secure a place for an intelligent designer, ID must say, "Since human beings MUST exist in the present, all the necessary prerequisites MUST have attained in the past." So, ID rests upon a premise that the existence of human beings is necessary. This seems likely to be a difficult claim to justify. Those supporting ID would desire to appeal to the bible for support. Doing so, however, would be begging the question, as they would be employing their intelligent designer in a proof of his own necessary existence.

isn't it also reality that could be appealed to, to argue a "neccessity" of humanity?

Plantinga (in a similar argument), doesn't attribute the beings in reality as we know it as neccessary beings, (as they are contingent) but that given all possible worlds, only this possible world could have been actualised by the (effectively) very fact that other worlds were NOT actualised (at least not "here"). Thus for Plantinga, speaking of other possible worlds where we were not actualised it to speak nonsense, those other worlds contain inherent contradictions (which is why they were not actualised), and possibly even beg the question.

What I'm saying is that if you speak of science in terms of probablilities, you must next ask the question of what do Probabilities mean??

Do they mean that each outcome is undetermined or could they be determined? If you say they are indeterministic, then the next question I have is, what does that mean?

Let’s look at quantum theory and the human level of interaction in the world. The quantum level is inherently indeterministic (at least, most commonly agreed so), and yet on our level determinism seems to be the modus operandi. So can we say that the world as we know it is indeterministic or deterministic? Is the indeterminism of quantum consequential or (basically) just a neat thing to know? (Personally I believe it is consequential in a very specific case, but otherwise inconsequential).

Likewise, are the probabilities of any consequence or simply a neat thing to know about the facts of the matter? I can throw a ball across a five foot room and expect it to hit the wall… and you can work out all the probabilities of the ball hitting the wall, but they’re effectively useless as anything other than trivia. The fact of the matter is that the ball was determined to hit the wall by an outside agent. Sure you might argue there is the chance that I’d miss the wall, and thus probability does matter, but be realistic, if I was a perfect designer, there’d be no chance of me missing the wall, that problem there is not the analogy but fact I’m imperfect and can’t account for all possible outcomes and correct for them.

The interpretation of probabilities matters greatly. Are they descriptive or are they (basically) prescriptive? Do they describe or mandate events? And I’d argue that scientists that seek to say they’re being non-philosophical and even-handed letting the facts weigh themselves, are gravely mistaken about their own views… scientists DO believe in an interpretation of probabilities and various other things that are biased affect the work of scientists.

Which is why I believe scientist NEED to be educated (within the fields themselves) about opposing philosophical views, such that they can attempt to be less biased, and such that the philosophically biased language that already exists can be understood as just descriptions of one metaphysical possibility, and not as “that’s the way it really is”.